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ABSTRACT: Leibniz argues against Descartes’s conception of material substance 
based on considerations of unity. I examine a key premise of Leibniz’s argument, 
what I call the Plurality Thesis—the claim that matter (i.e. extension alone) is a 
plurality of parts. More specifically, I engage an objection to the Plurality Thesis 
stemming from what I call Material Monism—the claim that the physical world is a 
single material substance. I argue that Leibniz can productively engage this 
objection based on his view that matter is discrete. The discreteness of matter 
provides two aspects of support for the Plurality Thesis. First, it indicates that the 
parts of matter do not share boundaries and are, therefore, independent in an 
important sense. Second, it indicates that the parts of matter are determinate and 





Leibniz argues against the Cartesian conception of material substance, i.e. the view that 
matter consists in extension alone, based on considerations of unity. Leibniz’s Argument 
from Unity, as I will call it, can be rendered as follows: 
 
(1) Matter (i.e. extension alone) is a plurality of parts to infinity. 
(2) A plurality of parts cannot be a true unity. 
(3) A substance must be a true unity. 
Therefore,  
(4) Matter (i.e. extension alone) is not a substance.1 
 
Leibniz’s use of the term “matter” in this argument refers both to material stuff in general, 
thus the entire physical plenum, and to particular material things, i.e. objects typically 
taken to be material substances, rocks, tables, motorcycles, and the like. The Argument 
from Unity is, therefore, a general indictment of the substantiality of purely material things.  
 
1 One text that supports this particular rendering is from Leibniz’s New System: “After much reflection, I 
perceived that it is impossible to find the principles of true unity in matter alone [la matiere seule], or in what 
is only passive, since everything in it is only a collection or aggregation [collection ou amas] of parts to 
infinity. Now, a multitude can derive its reality only from true unities, which have some other origin and are 
considerably different from points, which all agree cannot make up the continuum. Therefore, in order to find 
these real entities I was forced to have recourse to a formal atom, since a material thing cannot be both 
material and, at the same time, perfectly indivisible, that is, endowed with a true unity” (GP IV, 478-479 = AG 
139). 
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This argument, or, at least, nearly-identical arguments, can be found in Leibniz’s 
texts from as early as the 1670s until as late as 1714; it is a staple of his metaphysical 
program.2 Despite the prevalence of this argument in Leibniz’s texts, and the corresponding 
prevalence of discussions of it in the secondary literature, certain important aspects of the 
argument remain underdeveloped. In particular, I will consider how Leibniz supports 
Premise (1) Matter (i.e. extension alone) is a plurality of parts to infinity—what I will call 
the Plurality Thesis. More specifically, I will consider how Leibniz supports the Plurality 
Thesis in light of challenges stemming from certain types of monism.3 
 Versions of monism have been around since Parmenides and continue to pop up in 
present-day discussions.4 The type of monism I have in mind in connection with Leibniz’s 
Argument from Unity is what I call Material Monism. According to Material Monism, the 
entire physical world is a single material substance. Although certain regions of the 
physical world might have different features from other regions, the physical world has no 
parts properly speaking, i.e. regions that can exist independently of the whole.5 To put the 
point in early modern terminology, regions of the physical world differ only modally from 
one another; there is no real, i.e. substantial, distinction between them.6 A corollary of 
Material Monism, then, is the view that the entire physical world is ontologically prior to its 
regions. That is, each region depends for its existence on the entire physical world. Thus, 
Material Monism stands in stark contrast with a prevalent early modern commitment 
(shared by Leibniz) that material parts are ontologically prior to the wholes they compose.7 
 The picture of the physical world that Material Monism provides can be described as 
a top-down conception. This conception threatens to undermine the Plurality Thesis, since it 
straightforwardly denies that matter is a plurality in Leibniz’s sense, i.e. a collection of pre-
existing parts. For the Plurality Thesis to stand, it requires what can be described as a 
bottom-up conception of the physical world, one that supports the contention that matter 
(i.e. extension alone) should be understood to be a plurality of pre-existing parts.8 
Furthermore, various recent papers have argued that Descartes’s conception of the 
 
2 See, e.g., A 6.4, 1464 = Ar 257-9, GP IV, 478-479 = AG 139, A 2.3, 546 = Lo 73. This argument has received 
lots of attention in the literature, and I cannot reference all discussion here. For a representative sample, see, 
e.g., Sleigh (1990), Ch. 6, Levey (2003), Garber (2008), Ch. 2, and Arthur (2018), Ch. 1. 
3 For further discussion of the role of the Plurality Thesis in Leibniz’s Argument from Unity, including how 
Leibniz’s Argument from Unity is vulnerable to objections stemming from certain types of monism, see, e.g., 
Harmer (2018) and Jorati (forthcoming). 
4 For present-day versions, see, e.g., Schaffer (2010) and Horgan and Potrč (2008). 
5 I use the term “region” as distinct from “part” in order to emphasize the dependence on the entire physical 
world. “Part” often brings a sense of independence and/or priority along with it. 
6 This way of expressing the view shows up in Leibniz’s correspondence with Burcher de Volder. See A 2.3, 
530 = Lo 61. See also section 3 below for further discussion of De Volder’s view. For elaboration of modal 
versus real distinction, see Descartes, Principles 1.60, AT VIII, 29 = CSMK 1, 213. 
7 The distinction I am making here is similar, though not identical to the distinction Thomas Holden draws 
between the so-called “actual parts doctrine”, according to which each part of a whole is a distinct existent in 
its own right (2004, 16-17), and the so-called “potential parts doctrine”, according to which parts are created 
via division from a previously existing whole (2004, 17-18). Material Monism is different from the potential 
parts doctrine insofar as it makes the further claim that the “parts” that arise from “division” are not, strictly 
speaking, entities in their own right, but merely features or characteristics (“local variations” to use Horgan 
and Potrč’s phrase [2008, 168]) of the entire physical world. 
8 This point is also made by Harmer (2018), 92. 
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material world aligns with Material Monism.9 If this is correct, then insofar as Leibniz’s 
Argument from Unity is directed at the Cartesian conception of material substance, the 
argument would miss its mark entirely. This would be an unfortunate situation for Leibniz, 
since the Argument from Unity is one of his major lines of objection to Descartes’s view, 
which, as I have mentioned above, can be found in texts spanning nearly Leibniz’s entire 
life.10 
 This is all to say that a great deal of Leibniz’s theory of substance depends on his 
ability to defend his position against challenges of this type. Although Leibniz himself does 
not encounter the challenge stemming from Material Monism until late in his life, his 
metaphysical system has the resources to engage it productively. As I will argue, Leibniz’s 
view that matter is (and must be) discrete provides support for the bottom-up conception 
of the physical world needed to get his Argument from Unity off the ground. 
 Discreteness is a structural feature of matter: it concerns the relationships between 
the parts of a material thing. There are two important features of discreteness that I will 
develop. First, to say that matter is discrete means that the parts of a material thing do not 
share boundaries with one another, that each part has its own distinct boundary (even 
though there is no empty space between them), and that each part is itself made up of parts 
with their own boundaries. This supports the idea that the parts of matter are independent 
in an important sense, namely that they are capable of differential motions. Second, 
discreteness expresses a certain priority relation between parts and wholes; in particular, 
material parts are prior to the wholes they compose. As for why matter is discrete, I will 
suggest that, according to Leibniz, discreteness is an inevitable feature of concrete material 
existence. I will marshal this aspect of Leibniz’s position in particular to address the 
challenge introduced by Material Monism. My approach will be both developmental, i.e., I 
will track some of the major developments of Leibniz’s conception of matter in order to 
show how he arrives at this position, and conceptual, i.e., I will argue that the discreteness 
of matter is required to make sense of certain features of the material world. 
In Section 2, I will develop the notion of discreteness, its origins and development 
within Leibniz’s thought as well as its particular character. In Section 3, I will show how the 
conception of plurality that follows from matter’s discreteness can be marshaled to address 
 
9 See, e.g., Gueroult (1984), Nelson & Smith (2010), and Sowaal 2004. For views rejecting the monist reading 
of Descartes, see, e.g., Rozemond (2011), Normore (2008), and Kaufman (2014). 
10 It is worth noting certain features of the dialectical situation as it pertains to Leibniz’s Argument from Unity 
in general and the Plurality Thesis in particular. If Material Monism is not Descartes’s view, but instead, 
Descartes accepts Leibniz’s claim that material parts are ontologically prior to material wholes—a view for 
which there is certainly textual evidence and which has been defended in the literature on this topic (see, e.g., 
Normore [2010] and Rozemond [2011])—then Leibniz’s Argument from Unity already has some traction 
against Descartes and the need to defend the Plurality Thesis in terms of the discreteness of matter is not as 
central to Leibniz’s case. This is how things unfold in, e.g., Leibniz’s correspondence with Arnauld, who does 
not develop an objection to Leibniz’s Argument from Unity in terms of Material Monism, but instead in terms 
of Leibniz’s conception of substantiality, i.e. Premise (3) above. See A 2.2 153 = Vo 171. For discussion, see, 
e.g. Sleigh (1990), Ch. 6. In fact, as I argue elsewhere, in such a dialectical context, Leibniz’s Argument from 
Unity is best understood as applying to matter qua its divisibility, i.e. the argument will apply to both merely 
divisible matter (with merely potential parts) and to actually divided matter (with actually divided parts). See 
Harmer (2019). Still, Leibniz’s reasons for asserting the discreteness of matter are more than merely 
dialectical, and as I hope will become apparent below, Leibniz’s commitment to the discreteness of matter is 
important in its own right. 
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the challenge introduced by Material Monism: it supports both the plurality of matter and 
the priority of material parts to material wholes. Finally, in Section 4, I will explicate and 
defend a key commitment supporting Leibniz’s view that matter is discrete, namely the 
idea that to exist is to be determinate. As I will show, this commitment is at the center of 
Leibniz’s metaphysical project and it is, therefore, no surprise to find it standing behind 
one of Leibniz’s most powerful lines of argument against the Cartesian conception of 
material substance. 
 
2. Discreteness: Origins and Development 
 
Intuitively, something is discrete if it is broken apart or choppy, as opposed to 
smooth or without gaps, which would make it continuous. This intuitive rendering can be 
seen in the traditional distinction between discrete and continuous quantity, which is 
Aristotelian in origin. I will begin by showing that Leibniz understands the distinction 
between continuous and discrete in Aristotelian terms, i.e. in terms of the parts of a thing 
sharing or not sharing boundaries, and that this distinction shapes Leibniz’s conception of 
the nature of materiality.11 This is more explicit in early texts, but a clear line can be drawn 
to later texts as well, especially if the order of development is considered. To support this 
contention, I will examine a representative sample of Leibniz’s thought about matter from 
the late 1660s until the end of his life. 
According to Aristotle, the distinction between discrete and continuous is an 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive distinction within the category of quantity. It applies to 
wholes, which is to say, anything with parts or capable of having parts, and sorts them 
according to the relations that hold between their parts—in particular, the structural 
relations (or perhaps, more anachronistically, the topological relations). Whether 
something is continuous or discrete is a function of whether or not its parts share 
boundaries with one another.12 
Aristotle presents the distinction as follows: 
 
Of quantities some are discrete, others continuous…. Discrete are number and 
language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and also, besides these, time and 
place. For the parts of a number have no common boundary at which they join 
together. For example, if five is a part of ten the two fives do not join together at any 
common boundary but are separate; nor do the three and seven join together at any 
common boundary. Nor could you ever in the case of a number find a common 
boundary of its parts, but they are always separate. Hence number is one of the 
discrete quantities…. A line on the other hand, is a continuous quantity. For it is 
possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join together, a point. And for 
 
11 My discussion of discreteness is largely indebted to Arthur (2001) and Levey (1999) and (2003b). My 
discussion differs from Arthur’s and Levey’s insofar as they are both focused on the notion of continuity in 
particular, while my focus is on discreteness. Furthermore, I add the idea that the role of discreteness is to 
undergird a bottom-up conception of the physical world. 
12 See Levey (1999) for a discussion of the relationship between Leibniz’s views about continuity and the 
topological notion of connectedness. Levey considers texts from the early 1670s, which contain views that 
Leibniz does not hold either before or after those years. I will emphasize the consistent thread from early to 
late. 
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a surface, a line. For the parts of a plane join together at some common boundary. 
Similarly in the case of a body one could find a common boundary—a line or a 
surface—at which the parts of the body join together. (Categories I.6, 4b20-5a14; 
trans. J. L. Ackrill)13 
 
From this text, we can extract basic characterizations of continuity and discreteness:  
 
Continuity: a quantity is continuous just in case its parts have a common boundary. 
Discreteness: a quantity is discrete just in case its parts have no common boundary. 
 
In an early letter to Jacob Thomasius, Leibniz develops an account of the 
discreteness of matter that relies on an explicitly Aristotelian understanding of 
discreteness. Although many of the views Leibniz expresses in this letter are aspects of a 
rather grand reconciliation project between Aristotelian philosophy and mechanistic 
natural philosophy, a project that Leibniz does not continue to develop in these terms, 
many of the views that Leibniz expresses about matter in this letter persist.14 An 
examination of this early letter, therefore, can provide some insight into Leibniz’s later 
views.15 
The task of Leibniz’s stated reconciliation project is to explain Aristotle’s principles 
in mechanical terms, i.e. by appeal to only magnitude, figure, and motion.16 He begins with 
the Aristotelian notion of primary matter, which he reconceives to be “mass itself, in which 
there is nothing but extension and antitypy or impenetrability” (A 2.1, 26 = L 95). He 
argues that primary matter “is a being prior to all form, since it has its own existence. For 
whatever is in some space exists, and this cannot be denied of mass itself, even if it entirely 
lacks motion and discontinuity” (A 2.1, 26 = L 95). Primary matter, then, is a motionless, 
formless, and continuous mass. Leibniz notes further that primary matter “being 
continuous […] is not cut into parts and therefore does not actually have boundaries” (A 
2.1, 26 = L 95).17 Noteworthy here is the connection Leibniz asserts between division and 
boundaries: he infers the absence of boundaries from the absence of cuts. 
One especially difficult part of Leibniz’s stated reconciliation project is accounting 
for Aristotelian forms in merely mechanical terms. Leibniz’s approach to this problem is 
 
13 In light of this passage from Aristotle, it appears that Leibniz is not only departing from the Cartesians by 
claiming that matter is discrete rather than continuous; he is departing from a longer philosophical tradition. 
Though the reason for why matter is a continuous quantity for Aristotle and the scholastic Aristotelians might 
differ from that of Descartes, insofar as quantity for Aristotelians is considered a proper accident of body—
inalienable but not but not itself part of the essence. For further discussion, see Ariew and Gabbey (1998), 
434. For Descartes’s explicit identification of matter with continuous quantity, see Meditation 5, AT VII, 63 = 
CSMK II, 44. 
14 Of course, Leibniz does continue to employ Aristotelian notions such as form, entelechy, etc. but Leibniz’s 
later deployment of these notions differs from the attempt in this letter to explicate them in purely 
mechanical terms. 
15 For a detailed and insightful discussion of the conception of discreteness, but especially its counterpart, 
continuity, in the letters to Thomasius, see Levey (1999), 82-85. 
16 This is Leibniz’s list. See A 2.1, 25 = L 94. 
17 This notion of primary matter will later be rejected by Leibniz, since, as he will later argue, continuous 
mass, being purely passive, cannot exist. See, e.g., A 3.7, 885 = Lo 9. 
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simply to reduce forms to figures or shapes. But for there to be figures or shapes in matter, 
Leibniz argues, matter must have boundaries. He writes, 
 
[…] since figure is the boundary [terminus] of a body, a boundary is needed to 
introduce figure into bodies. But a discontinuity of parts is necessary in order to 
have a variety of boundaries arising in matter. For by the very fact that parts are 
discontinuous, each one will have separate boundaries [terminos separatos], since 
Aristotle defines the continuum as things whose limits are one. (A 2.1, 27 = L 95) 
 
This passage contains important claims about the relationship between boundaries and 
discontinuity. Discontinuity, in particular “a discontinuity of parts”—just is the presence of 
separate boundaries—terminos separatos. This is Aristotle’s understanding of discreteness, 
as Leibniz notes by contrasting it with how Aristotle characterizes continuity. Thus, for 
matter to have forms—i.e. shapes—it must be discrete in the Aristotelian sense.18 
 The most important part of this early letter concerns Leibniz’s account of how 
discontinuity is introduced into primary matter: 
 
[…] discontinuity can be introduced into the formerly continuous mass in two 
ways—first, in such a way that contiguity is at the same time destroyed, when the 
parts are so pulled apart from each other that a vacuum is left; or in such a way that 
contiguity remains. This happens when the parts are left together but moved in 
different directions. For example, two spheres, one included in the other, can be 
moved in different directions and yet remain contiguous, though they cease to be 
continuous. (A 2.1, 27 = L 96) 
 
Leibniz identifies two ways that discontinuity can be introduced, both of which involve 
motion.19 The second scenario—“when the parts are left together”—seems to present more 
of a challenge for an account of how discontinuity is introduced. If the parts of matter 
cannot be “pulled apart from one another” but instead must be “left together”, in what 
sense can they be discontinuous? Leibniz’s response is that relative motion, even if the 
parts remain in contact, introduces boundaries into matter, boundaries which are not 
shared even by adjacent parts. Thus, although the parts will remain contiguous, they will no 
longer be continuous.20 
 
18 Leibniz will later argue that matter has no precise shape, another consideration which he uses against the 
existence of material substance. See, e.g., A 2.2, 250 = Vo 253. For discussion of Leibniz’s view that bodies 
have no precise shape, see, e.g., Marshall (2011) and Levey (2005). I am sympathetic with Levey’s view that 
bodies have infinitely complex shapes, so long as this is understood to mean, given Leibniz’s views about the 
infinite, that they have no shape whatever, strictly speaking. This view about shapes will converge with 
Leibniz’s considered account of discreteness because, since matter is actually infinitely divided, any 
boundaries possessed by the parts of matter will be vanishing—i.e. subject to further division—and so, in a 
sense, not really there. I return to the topic of shapes and the material world in section 4 below. 
19 Leibniz considers two scenarios because in 1699 at least he holds that “neither a vacuum nor a plenum is 
necessary; the nature of things can be explained in either way” (A 2.1, 25 = L 94). So he is covering either case. 
Of course, since Leibniz will later uphold the plenum, the second scenario is more likely to have connections 
with his later views. 
20 Aristotle characterizes contiguity as follows: “a thing that is in succession and touches is contiguous” 
(Physics 5, 227a10; trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye). 
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 The conclusion, then, of Leibniz’s attempt to reduce forms to figures is as follows: 
“[…] division comes from motion, the bounding [termini] of parts comes from division, their 
figures come from this bounding, and form from figures: therefore, forms come from 
motion” (A 2.1, 27 = L 96). Most important are the following two statements: 
 
Division: Division comes from motion. 
Bounding: The bounding of parts comes from division. 
 
Although the stated reconciliation project does not figure among Leibniz’s lasting 
commitments, the connection between motion and division, and between motion and 
bounded parts is a persistent feature of Leibniz’s account of matter. Division, i.e. the 
connection between motion and division has been well documented in the literature.21 
What has not been emphasized is Bounding, i.e. the connection between division and the 
bounding of parts. But it is this second claim, rather than the first, that provides the clearest 
connection between the discreteness of matter and both the plurality of matter and the 
bottom-up conception of the physical world that the Plurality Thesis relies on. 
While Leibniz’s conception of discreteness initially appears in the context of his 
physics and is, as I have described it, a structural feature of matter, as his thought develops 
it takes a decidedly metaphysical turn. Leibniz’s views about matter become closely 
connected to his engagement with questions related to the composition of the continuum, 
which Leibniz himself characterizes as one of the two great labyrinths of human reason.22 
In trying to chart Leibniz’s development on this point, one encounters a terminological 
labyrinth rivalling the philosophical labyrinth indicated by Leibniz. For this reason, I will 
introduce the following table of terminology, though its complete significance will not be 
apparent at first: 
 
Terms Indicating Discreteness Terms Indicating Continuity 
• Bounded Parts • Unbounded Parts 
• Assignable Parts • Unassignable Parts 
• Determinate Parts 
• Indeterminate Parts 
• Distinguished Parts 
• Actual Parts • Potential Parts 
 
This table provides pairs of terms that Leibniz uses to contrast the parts of continuous 
quantities with the parts of discrete quantities.23 In the Thomasius letter, the first pair of 
terms is used to characterize the difference between discreteness and continuity. Primary 
 
21 See, e.g., Arthur (1989) and Levey (1998). 
22 See, e.g., Grua 326 = AG 95: “[…] there are two great labyrinths of the human mind, one concerning the 
composition of the continuum, and the other concerning the nature of freedom, and they arise from the same 
source, infinity.” See, Arthur (2013) for a comprehensive discussion of Leibniz’s engagement with the 
labyrinth of the continuum. 
23 In certain cases, I have resorted to cognates of Leibniz’s actual terminology for ease of expression. 
However, when I discuss the texts in which each pair of terms is found, I will note the exact words 
themselves.  
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matter is continuous, with unbounded (i.e. undivided) parts—or, in some sense, no parts at 
all. Matter, the matter that exists in the world around us, is discrete with bounded parts. 
In some notes from 1676, Leibniz again asserts the discreteness of matter. In the 
following passage, Leibniz’s tone is tentative, and he flirts with the conclusion that, since 
matter is discrete, it is ultimately composed of points: 
 
Matter alone can be explained by a plurality without continuity. And matter seems 
in fact to be a discrete being. For though it is assumed to be solid, matter taken 
without a cement, through the motion of another body, for example, will be reduced 
to a state of liquidity or divisibility. Hence it follows that it is composed of points. 
This I prove as follows: every perfect liquid is composed of points, because it can be 
dissolved into points, namely, by the motion of a solid within it. Matter therefore is 
discrete being, not continuous. It is merely contiguous and is united by motion or by 
some mind. (A 6.3, 473 = L 158) 
 
Note, in particular, the connection Leibniz suggests in the opening of this passage between 
plurality and discreteness. Matter is a plurality without continuity; matter is discrete. 
Furthermore, the sense in which matter is a plurality is made very explicit: matter is a 
collection of points.24  
An important shift takes place later in the same year, a shift that introduces the 
second main component of discreteness noted above: the priority of material parts to 
material wholes. If the discreteness of matter is conceived as a resolution into points, it 
may follow that the parts of matter do not share boundaries (points, of course, are 
incapable of overlap), but it is difficult to see how points can be prior to wholes. After all, as 
Leibniz understands points, they are themselves mere boundaries or extrema of material 
things.  
Later in 1676, Leibniz develops a model for discrete matter that does not entail its 
resolution into points. In the dialogue Pacidius Philalethi, Leibniz compares the division of 
matter to a folded tunic: 
 
It is just as if we suppose a tunic to be scored with folds multiplied to infinity in such 
a way that there is no fold so small that it is not subdivided by a new fold: and yet in 
this way no point in the tunic will be assignable [assignabile] without its being 
moved in different directions by its neighbors, although it will not be torn apart by 
them. And the tunic cannot be said to be resolved all the way down into points; 
instead, although some folds are smaller than others to infinity, bodies are always 
extended and points never become parts, but always remain mere extrema. (A 6.4, 
556 = Ar 187) 
 
 
24 Note that the bounded parts that Leibniz is developing in these and later texts are not non-material 
substances, but material things. Thus the sense in which matter is an aggregate (as this relates to matter’s 
discreteness) is that it is an aggregate of material parts, not an aggregate of substances. The latter notion 
comes to be how Leibniz articulates what he calls “second matter”. See, e.g., Leibniz’s 1698 letter to Bernoulli: 
“secondary matter, i.e. mass, is not a substance, but substances” (A 3.7, 885 = Lo 9). For further discussion of 
how matter is a plurality in the sense of second matter, see Arthur (2018), Ch. 2. 
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The same relationship between motion and division is present here as in the Thomasius 
letter. More importantly, though, Leibniz formulates his commitment to the actually infinite 
division of matter in a way that avoids the conclusion that matter is composed of points. He 
claims that “there is no fold so small that it is not subdivided by a new fold”. Consequently, 
every part of the tunic is assignable—assignabile—even though there is no end to the folds 
of the tunic. This provides a slightly different sense in which matter is a plurality: matter is 
a collection of assignable parts (but not points). 
The tunic model is paired with another important result that Leibniz reaches in the 
1670s concerning the different part-whole priority relations that obtain in continuous 
versus discrete wholes. Here, the discussion appears in a slightly different context (i.e. not 
primarily a discussion of material structure): 
 
There can be no such thing as a fastest motion, nor a greatest number. For number 
is something discrete, where the whole is not prior to the parts, but the converse. 
There cannot be a fastest motion, since motion is a modification, and is the 
translation of a certain thing in a certain time—in short, just as there cannot be a 
greatest shape. There cannot be one motion of the whole; but there can be a kind of 
thought of everything. Whenever the whole is prior to the parts, then it is a 
maximum, as for example in space and in the continuum. If matter, like shape, is that 
which makes a modification, then it seems that there is not a whole of matter, either. 
(A 6.4, 520 = Ar 121) 
 
Leibniz claims that in discrete things the parts are prior to the whole, while in continuous 
things it is the reverse. This means that the parts of matter (since matter is discrete) have 
to be, in some sense, independent of the wholes they make up and in fact prior to them. If 
the parts of matter were points, as Leibniz had previously argued, then the parts could not 
be prior to the whole because points are, as Leibniz explicitly says in Pacidius Philalethi, 
“mere extrema”, i.e. they are the endpoints of lines, which are the edges of planes, which 
are the surfaces of things—but things are prior to their surfaces, edges, and endpoints. Still, 
the parts of matter are assignable. And they are assignable precisely in virtue of their 
boundaries, which they do not share with their neighbors. The notion of an assignable part 
presented in Pacidius Philalethi is, therefore, along the same trajectory as the notion of a 
bounded part from the letter to Thomasius. 
In a May 1702 study, given the title “On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians”, 
Leibniz uses the term “distinguished” to express the same commitment as expressed by the 
terms “assignable” and “bounded”.25 Once more, Leibniz’s remarks are in the context of a 
discussion of extension. Having defined extension as “a diffusion or repetition of a certain 
nature”, Leibniz continues, 
 
[…] every repetition (or collection [multitudo] of things of the same kind) is either 
discrete, as, for example, in things that are counted, where the parts of the aggregate 
are distinguished [discernuntur], or continuous, where the parts are indeterminate 
 
25 Although this text is some 25 years from the 1676 notes, I think there is a clear connection, which is 
highlighted by the terminological distinctions introduced above. 
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[indeterminata] and one can obtain parts in an infinite number of ways. (GP IV, 394 
= AG 251) 
 
The contrast here is between parts that are distinguished—discernuntur—which pertain to 
discrete things, and parts that are indeterminate—indeterminata—which pertain to 
continuous things. The sense in which matter is a plurality, according to this text, is that 
matter is a collection of distinguished parts. 
The emerging picture is further filled in in a 31 October 1705 letter to Princess 
Sophie. In this case, Leibniz highlights the fact that the parts of matter are determinate, 
given that matter is actually divided in a particular way in virtue of the actual state of the 
physical universe: 
 
[…] we must say that space is not at all composed of points, nor time of instants, nor 
mathematical motion of moments, nor intensity of extreme degrees. That is, that 
matter, that the course of things, that finally all actual composites, is a discrete 
quantity, but that space, time, mathematical motion, intensity or the continual 
increase one conceives in speed and in other qualities, and finally all that which 
gives an estimate which ranges over possibilities, is a continuous quantity which is 
indeterminate [indetermineé] in itself, or indifferent to the parts one can take in it, 
and which are actually found there in nature. The mass of bodies is actually divided 
[divisée actuellement] in a determinate [determineé] manner, and nothing there is 
precisely continuous; but space, or the perfect continuity which is in the idea, 
represents nothing but an indeterminate possibility of dividing it as one would like. 
(GP VII, 562) 
 
Here the contrast between continuous and discrete quantity is elaborated in the context of 
distinguishing between actual and ideal things (here, “possibilities”). The reason Leibniz 
gives for attributing discrete quantity to actual things is that “[t]he mass of bodies is 
actually divided in a determinate manner”. In contrast, an ideal thing, which is a continuous 
quantity, “represents nothing but an indeterminate possibility of dividing it however one 
likes”. So the contrast is between determinate parts on the one hand and indeterminate 
parts on the other. 
 A mere twenty days earlier, Leibniz has formulated a similar distinction in a draft 
letter to De Volder. The material in this draft can help to clarify what Leibniz means by 
determinate and indeterminate parts. He writes, 
 
In fact, matter is not continuous but discrete and actually divided to infinity, even if 
no assignable part of space is devoid of matter. Yet space, like time, is not something 
substantial, but something ideal, and consists in possibilities, i.e. the order of 
possible coexistents at any given time. And so, there are no divisions in it, except 
those that the mind makes, and the part is posterior to the whole. (GP II, 278 = Lo 
327) 
 
According to Leibniz, a continuum can be divided in infinitely many ways. Take, for 
example, a unit line segment. This can be divided into two half-unit segments; or into four 
quarter-unit segments; or into one half-unit segment and two quarter-unit segments; or 
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into three third-units; and so on, indefinitely. Leibniz’s point is that there is nothing about 
the unit line segment (and by extension any continuous thing) that dictates how it is to be 
divided—that is up to some observer to determine. Not so with discrete things. In discrete 
things everything is actually divided in a determinate manner. In other words, at any time 
there is an already-given structure of divisions, a way in which the parts are already 
assigned. 
 The contrast between indeterminate and determinate parts, then, has to do with 
whether or not there is an already-given structure of divisions or not. If there is, then what 
we have is a discrete whole, in which an observer can merely perceive the divisions that 
are already there. If there is no such structure, then what we have is a continuous whole, in 
which an observer can “create” divisions (at least, in intellectus), since there is no privileged 
structure of divisions among the infinitely many possible ones. The sense in which matter 
is a plurality in these two texts, then, is that matter is a collection of determinate parts. 
Notice how, in these texts, the notion of discreteness is connected with concrete existence. 
To be discrete is to be determinate, to have all structural features specified. To be 
continuous, by contrast, is to be indeterminate, to have certain structural features 
unspecified. Looming in the background is the very powerful idea that to exist is to be 
determinate.26 This suggests that discreteness is a requirement of concrete material 
existence. 
This idea is drawn out clearly in a very well-known passage from a 19 January 1706 
letter to De Volder. In this passage, Leibniz draws a distinction between actual and ideal 
things: 
 
In actual things there is nothing but a discrete quantity, namely the multitude of 
monads, i.e., simple substances, which in any sensible aggregate, i.e. any aggregate 
corresponding to the phenomena, is, indeed, greater than any number however 
large. But continuous quantity is something ideal that pertains to possible things 
and to actual things in so far as they are possible things. Of course, the continuum 
involves indeterminate [indeterminatas] parts, but, nevertheless, nothing is 
indefinite [indefinitum] in actual things. Indeed, any division that can be made in 
actual things has been made. Actual things are composed as a number is composed 
from unities, ideal things as a number is composed from fractions. There are actual 
[actu] parts in a real whole, but not in an ideal whole. Indeed, when we—confusing 
ideal things with real substances—seek actual parts [partes actuales] in the order of 
possible things and indeterminate parts in an aggregate of actual things, we 
entangle ourselves in the labyrinth of the continuum and in inexplicable 
contradictions. (GP II, 282-283 = Lo 333) 
 
This text represents the culmination of Leibniz’s thought over the preceding decades. 
Actual and ideal are correlated with discrete and continuous, respectively. Actual things 
(i.e. discrete things) are exhaustively divided into parts in a determinate way. There are 
 
26 I will engage this very powerful, but also somewhat elusive idea at more length in Section 4 below. For a 
recent discussion of closely related issues see Wilson (2012). Wilson argues that “determinable properties 
might well be part of a (relatively) fundamental base” (15). Insofar as determinables involve indeterminacy in 
some sense, Wilson’s conclusion seems to diverge from Leibniz’s idea here. 
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parts, already given, and prior to any wholes composed of them. Consequently, actual 
things (in this sense) are always aggregates—i.e. collections. They only exist insofar as a 
multitude of actual parts exists. Ideal things (i.e. continuous things), by contrast, are not 
divided into parts and, as such, are indefinite in a certain respect. There are no parts 
already given, and the whole is prior to any parts that are subsequently divided out 
(division here being division in intellectus). Insofar as ideal things are possible things they 
do not have any concrete existence, but, as their designation indicates, are merely entia 
rationis. 
 The central point for the present investigation is this: continuity involves 
indeterminacy, while discreteness does not. This indeterminacy presents a problem for 
concrete existence, on Leibniz’s view, because if the parts of a continuous entity are not 
already specified, if there is not already some built in structure of divisions, then we are 
forced to conclude that the continuous entity is composed from points. But this leads to 
paradox, as Leibniz’s sustained engagement with the Problem of the Composition of the 
Continuum makes clear.27 In order to avoid the “inexplicable contradictions” that follow 
when “we entangle ourselves in the labyrinth of the continuum”, Leibniz claims that 
concretely existing entities must be discrete, i.e. have fully determinate structural features.   
Leibniz is, therefore, committed to the following general claims: (1) for matter to 
actually exist is for it to be discrete, (2) to be discrete is to be a plurality, and (3) to be 
discrete is to have parts that are prior to the wholes they compose. To be sure, the 
metaphysical commitments in the background of this passage are very different from those 
operating in Leibniz’s letter to Thomasius. But given the trajectory that I have followed 
from 1669, I think that the connection is clear: the physically bounded parts of the 
Thomasius letter are consonant with the metaphysically actual parts of the letter to De 
Volder; the latter is just a development of the former. 
 
3. Discreteness, Plurality, and Part-Whole Priority 
 
The developmental story just recited can be shown to support the two aspects of 
discreteness needed to support the Plurality Thesis. In this section, I will address the 
following two sets of questions. First, how does the discreteness of matter establish that 
matter is a plurality? In other words, how does the claim that material things have either 
bounded, assignable, distinguished, determinate, or actual parts give Leibniz license to 
conclude that material things are, properly speaking, pluralities? And second, how does the 
discreteness of matter support a bottom-up conception of the physical world? In other 
words, how does the claim that material things have bounded parts allow Leibniz to 
conclude that the parts of material things pre-exist the wholes they compose? I will address 
these questions in order. 
Aside from the developmental story presented above, there are conceptual or 
philosophical reasons that discreteness and plurality are connected. Based on the account 
of matter’s discreteness developed above, it is apparent that the following claims from the 
 
27 One discussion of the various paradoxes engendered by taking a line to be composed from points spans 
many pages of Leibniz’s dialogue Pacidius Philalethi. See A 6.4, 549ff. = Ar 173ff. 
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Thomasius letter are persistent features of Leibniz’s metaphysics of matter in some form or 
other: 
 
Division: Division comes from motion. 
Bounding: Boundaries come from division. 
 
To more clearly see the connection between discreteness and the Plurality Thesis, more 
subtle versions of these claims are needed. In some sense, what I offer here is an important 
correction to Leibniz’s own articulation of these commitments.28 However, I think that 
attention to Leibniz’s texts shows that what I say here is consistent with Leibniz’s later 
formulations, even if not explicitly stated by Leibniz himself.29 
In the early letter to Thomasius, Leibniz outlined a temporally ordered process in 
which Bounding follows from Division: continuous primary matter comes to have bounded 
parts through the introduction of motion. This cannot be the account that Leibniz has in 
mind in later texts. For one thing, in the Thomasius letter Leibniz is content to assert the 
existence of undivided, continuous primary matter. To quote Leibniz again, “[…] whatever 
is in some space exists, and this cannot be denied of mass itself, even if it entirely lacks 
motion and discontinuity” (A 2.1, 26 = L 95). In later texts, Leibniz is clear that this 
conception of matter tracks only an abstraction, as shown by this statement to De Volder: “I 
think that that which is extended has no unity except in the abstract, namely when we 
divert the mind from the internal motion of the parts by which each and every part of 
matter is, in turn, actually subdivided into different parts…” (A 2.3, 546 = Lo 73). The 
conditions of concrete existence entail that matter is always already subdivided into 
different (and bounded) parts. 
 The fact that matter is always already subdivided slightly changes the meanings of 
Division and Bounding above. The locution “come(s) from” in Division and Bounding cannot 
indicate a causal relationship between motion, division, and boundaries. It is not right to 
say that motion causes division, and then division causes boundaries. Rather, it indicates 
that when you have one, you automatically have the other.30 Thus, it is more accurate to 
paraphrase Division and Bounding as “when you have motion, you automatically have 
division” and “when you have division, you automatically have boundaries”, respectively.31 
This analysis suggests that division, motion, and boundaries are correlative notions for 
Leibniz. It also suggests that the discreteness of matter, a commitment that builds in 
 
28 My claims here also provide a correction to the literature on this topic, which often describes motion as 
causing divisions. See, e.g., Levey (1999), 86 and Arthur (2018), 39-48. 
29 In later texts, Leibniz often mentions the actually infinite division of matter alongside the claim that each 
part has different motion from its neighbors, without explicitly stating that the motion is what causes the 
division. See, e.g., Monadology ¶65: “...each portion of matter is not only divisible to infinity, as the ancients 
have recognized, but is also actually subdivided without end, each part divided into parts having some motion 
of their own; otherwise, it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe” (GP 
6, 618 = AG 221; emphasis added). 
30 See GM 7, 19 = L 667, where Leibniz characterizes the notion of “ingredient [ingrediens]” in a similar way. 
Though I am not claiming that Leibniz is deploying his notion of ingredient here, it is nonetheless helpful to 
note that Leibniz explicitly formulates a notion that is very similar to the one I am attributing to him here. 
31 I believe this is consistent with Leibniz’s later texts, though not stated by Leibniz explicitly, since in many 
texts Leibniz does not explicitly claim that motion causes divisions. See footnote 29 above.  
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Division, and Bounding above, is a general analysis of materiality. In other words, as I 
interpret Leibniz on this point, to be material (and to exist) is to be discrete.32 
 Consider the example of the two spheres that Leibniz presented to Thomasius.33  If 
we try to understand the scenario in causal terms, i.e. suppose that the motion of the 
smaller sphere causes the division of the two spheres and thus introduces a boundary (in 
fact, boundaries) where there were none before, the scenario ends up in confusion. The 
smaller sphere cannot move with respect to the larger sphere unless it already has its own 
boundary. If the boundary were shared, the smaller sphere would simply pull the larger one 
along with it. Relative motion, therefore, without gaps between the moving objects relies on 
discreteness or discontinuity; it cannot introduce it.34 
It follows from the understanding of discreteness outlined so far that discreteness 
grounds a certain type of independence among the parts of material things and any wholes 
they might compose. Call the type of independence “independence with respect to motion”: 
 
Independence with respect to Motion: Two things, a and b, are independent with 
respect to motion just in case a can move without b moving in the same way, and 
vice versa. 
 
As I have suggested, though not yet in these particular words, having distinct boundaries is 
a necessary condition of independence with respect to motion. That is, unless a and b have 
distinct boundaries, any motion of a will also be a motion of b, and vice versa. Thus, 
Leibniz’s notion of material part (i.e. bounded, assignable, distinguished, determinate, or 
actual part) might be explicated as part capable of moving independently. Because the 
notions of division, motion, and boundary are correlative with respect to material things, 
this relies on matter’s discreteness.35 
 
32 I add the parenthetical “and to exist” because there remains a conception of extension (though not 
materiality) in Leibniz on which extension is continuous and therefore not plural. But, as I said above, this 
conception captures an abstraction or an idealization and cannot actually exist. 
33 Recall: “For example, two spheres, one included in the other, can be moved in different directions and yet 
remain contiguous, though they cease to be continuous” (A 2.1, 27 = L 96). 
34 Leibniz returns to the example of the spheres in a 1698 text On Nature Itself (G 4, 504-516 = AG 155-167). 
There he argues that relative motion cannot provide a basis for distinguishing the spheres: “not even an ange l 
could find any difference between its [i.e. the sphere’s] states at different times, nor have any evidence for 
discerning whether the enclosed sphere is at rest or revolves, and what law of motion it follows” (AG 164). 
This might seem to undercut the role of discreteness in grounding the plurality of matter, since this text 
seems to suggest that if matter is extension alone, there can be no distinction between material things. 
However, I see this text as consistent with the view I am developing here. To see how, this text must be 
considered in view of Leibniz’s larger aim, namely to reject the Cartesian conception of merely extended 
substance. On Leibniz’s considered view immaterial, mind-like, active substances are required to ground the 
existence of discrete matter. Thus, Leibniz is at no stage of his argument committed to the view that merely 
extended, but also discrete matter can exist. This is just to say that, according to Leibniz, the structure of 
matter itself calls out for a foundation in immaterial substances. 
35 This result supports views previously developed by Arthur (2018) and Levey (1998) according to which 
Leibniz’s commitment to actually infinite division originates with an attempt to explain the possibility of 
motion in the plenum. See Descartes’s Principles II.33-36 and Leibniz’s comments on these articles at A 6.3, 
214 = Ar 24-25 and GP IV, 370 = L 393. I differ from Arthur and Levey by claiming that discreteness grounds 
the possibility of motion, whereas they claim that motion causes divisions. So, I agree with Arthur and Levey 
that independent motion is central to the notion of actual part, but I think that there is a deeper explanation 
for this independent motion, namely matter’s discreteness. 
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 Thus, as I see it, the discreteness of matter undergirds the Plurality Thesis by 
supporting the contention that matter is a plurality, but also by specifying the sense in 
which this is so. Now what about the connection between the discreteness of matter and 
the bottom-up conception of the physical world required by the Plurality Thesis? To 
address this question, I will turn to an objection to Leibniz’s Argument from Unity raised by 
Burcher de Volder. De Volder objects to the Plurality Thesis by suggesting an alternative 
model of the physical world, one on which the world is a single, material substance. On De 
Volder’s view the “parts” of matter are merely modes of the single, extended substance, not 
distinct things in their own right.36 De Volder supports this suggestion by noting that in 
virtue of the impossibility of empty space (a prevalent early modern commitment), 
material parts depend on one another, i.e. one part cannot exist without the entire material 
world existing. He then argues that this sort of dependence entails the unity of the entire 
physical world. 
While granting Leibniz the point that material parts are independent with respect to 
motion, De Volder presents the following objection: 
 
For if there is indeed no empty space, as you submit, it will not be possible for one 
part, which anyone might imagine for themselves, to be conceived without the 
others. From this it seems to follow that there is no real distinction [reale discrimen] 
between them, but that the distinction [discrimen] between parts that is imagined in 
these things consists not so much in a difference of substance as in a difference of 
modes [quam in modum varietate consistere]. (18 Feb 1699; A 2.3, 530 = LDV 61)37 
 
De Volder is arguing from a global dependence among material parts to the conclusion that 
the distinction between them is not strong enough to establish the type of plurality that 
Leibniz wants. 
 Though I cannot fully engage De Volder’s objection and Leibniz’s attempts to reply 
here, I want to develop one key idea as it relates to the discussion of discreteness above. 
The viability of De Volder’s objection hinges on the possibility that a material whole 
(namely, the entire material world) can be prior to its parts, i.e. that a top-down conception 
of the physical world is viable. As I have developed it above, Leibniz’s characterization of 
matter as discrete explicitly rejects this possibility. To exist and be material requires, on 
Leibniz’s analysis, that material parts are prior to material wholes. Why is this? If things 
were otherwise, then material things would be indeterminate, their structures would not 
be entirely specified or determined at any given time. But this, according to Leibniz, is 
 
36 De Volder’s suggestion has a great deal in common with Schaffer’s priority monism and Horgan and Potrč’s 
blobjectivism. See Schaffer (2010) and Horgan and Potrč (2008). 
37 De Volder provides different formulations of this argument. See, e.g., A 2.3, 562 = LDV 91. Also, De Volder’s 
reasoning here is reminiscent of Spinoza in E1P15S, though De Volder does not mention Spinoza: “For if 
corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts were really distinct [realiter distinctae], why, then, 
could one part not be annihilated, the rest remaining connected with one another [inter se connexis] as 
before? And why must they all be so fitted together that there is no vacuum? Truly, of things which are really 
distinct from one another, one can be, and remain in its condition, without the other. Since, therefore, there is 
no vacuum in nature (a subject I discuss elsewhere), but all its parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, 
it follows also that they cannot be really distinguished [realiter distingui], i.e., that corporeal substance, 
insofar as it is a substance, cannot be divided” (G 2, 59 = C 423). For a detailed discussion of De Volder’s 
objection see Harmer (2018), 72-84. 
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inconsistent with concrete material existence. Thus, even though material parts are not 
absolutely fundamental, they do enjoy a relative fundamentality when considered in 
relation to wholes they compose. In fact, they must, if the material world is to meet a 
crucial requirement of existence: to exist is to be determinate. Thus, material parts are prior 
to material wholes in just the sense required by the Plurality Thesis.  
 Consideration of De Volder’s objection shows, therefore, that both aspects of 
discreteness are crucial to its role in undergirding the Plurality Thesis: matter must have 
parts that are independent of one another (i.e. that have separate boundaries), and matter 
must have parts that are prior to the wholes they compose. If either of these aspects of 
discreteness is neglected, it cannot play the role it needs to in providing support for the 
Plurality Thesis, and, in turn, cannot play the role it needs to in Leibniz’s otherwise 
powerful Argument from Unity. 
 
4. To Exist is to be Determinate 
 
 One objection that might arise to the account I have provided so far is that I take one 
controversial claim, i.e. the Plurality Thesis, and rest it squarely on another (perhaps more) 
controversial claim, what I will call the Determinateness Thesis, i.e. “to exist is to be 
determinate”. Though I cannot provide a comprehensive defense of the Determinateness 
Thesis within the confines of the present paper, I will, in this final section, provide some 
indication as to why Leibniz holds this thesis. In fact, as I will argue here, the 
Determinateness Thesis is a commitment at the very center of Leibniz’s metaphysical 
project. Thus, it is not surprising to find the Determinateness Thesis providing support for 
one of Leibniz’s central arguments against the Cartesian conception of material substance. 
 There are two sets of questions pertaining to Leibniz’s commitment to the 
Determinateness Thesis that I will discuss here. First, in what sense must existing things be 
determinate for Leibniz? What are Leibniz’s reasons for thinking that to exist is to be 
determinate in this sense? And second, is this commitment consistent with other views 
Leibniz holds? In particular, is the Determinateness Thesis consistent with Leibniz’s 
analysis of bodies, including the claim that bodies have no precise shapes? I will claim that 
the sense in which existing things must be determinate is that they must have all features 
specified. This is because, based on Leibniz’s commitment to the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, there must be a basis for God’s 
discrimination between the features of the actual world and the features of all other 
possible worlds.38 Next, I will claim that the Determinateness Thesis is ultimately 
consistent with other aspects of Leibniz’s characterization of bodies. 
 The sense in which existing things are determinate for Leibniz is that they have all 
features specified. I have already motivated this idea as it pertains to the structural features 
of material things: to leave any indeterminacy in the structural features of material things 
is to induce paradoxes of the composition of the continuum. But Leibniz’s commitment to 
the Determinateness Thesis can be found in other contexts within Leibniz’s metaphysics as 
well. Consider, for example, Leibniz’s distinction between complete and incomplete 
notions. In order to exist, the nature of a substance must be complete. Incomplete natures, 
 
38 Of course, Leibniz’s God does not create material parts, but immaterial monads, whose existence and 
perceptions provide a basis from which bodies result. 
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by contrast, cannot exist without being further specified in some particular way. This is 
expressed in some of Leibniz’s remarks on one of Arnauld’s letters from 1686: 
 
Thus the concept of the sphere in general is incomplete or abstract, that is to say one 
considers in it only the essence of the sphere in general or in theory, disregarding 
singular circumstances, and consequently it in no way contains what is required for the 
existence of a certain sphere; but the concept of the sphere Archimedes had put on his 
tomb is complete and must contain everything that belongs to the subject of this form. 
This is why in individual or practical considerations, which revolve around singular 
things, beyond the form of the sphere there enters the matter of which it is made, the 
place, the time, and the other circumstances which by a continual concatenation would 
finally embrace the entire succession of the universe, if one could pursue everything 
these concepts contain. For the concept of this particle of matter of which this sphere is 
made embraces all the changes it has undergone and will one day undergo. And 
according to me each individual substance always contains traces of what has ever 
happened to it and marks of what will ever happen to it. (A 2.2, 45 = Vo 61-63) 
 
Leibniz’s claim is that a sphere in general cannot exist because certain of its features are left 
unspecified: its time, place, and mode of existence. Notice that Leibniz expresses the point 
by saying that the sphere in general does not include what is required for existence. 
 The ultimate basis for Leibniz’s requirement that the notions of existing things must 
be complete is his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), but more 
specifically, his application of the PSR to God’s creative activity. Consider Leibniz’s remarks 
in the Theodicy about God’s inability to create a sphere in general: “… suppose that God had 
decreed to make a material sphere, with no reason for making it of any particular size. This 
decree would be useless, it would carry with it that which would prevent its effect” (GP 6, 
232 = H 249). Thus, determinateness is a requirement of concrete existence because God 
requires a way to discriminate between the available options.39 Otherwise, God will have 
no sufficient reason to create this rather than that; such an indeterminate decree (or a 
decree about an indeterminate object) would prevent its own effect, since it would stand in 
violation of the PSR.  
To see how Leibniz connects this to his conception of materiality, consider his 
rejection of material atoms on the grounds that material atoms are intrinsically 
indiscernible and thus unsuitable objects of God’s creative choice. Writing to Clarke, 
Leibniz makes his view clear:  
 
This supposition of two indiscernibles, such as two pieces of matter perfectly alike, 
seems indeed to be possible in abstract terms, but it is not consistent with the order 
of things, nor with the divine wisdom by which nothing is admitted without reason. 
The vulgar fancy of such things because they content themselves with incomplete 
notions. And this is one of the faults of the atomists. (Ariew 40) 
 
 
39 For a more detailed discussion of the sense in which possible worlds and possible substances must be 
determinate for Leibniz, see Harmer (2017). 
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Thus, even though it might seem plausible to suggest that a material atom is determinate, 
this is not the case on Leibniz’s understanding of determinate as fully specified. As he says 
immediately following the quoted passage: “I do not admit in matter parts perfectly solid, 
or that are the same throughout without any variety or particular motion in their parts, as 
the pretended atoms are imagined to be” (LC 40). The atom lacks internal structure; within 
its boundaries it is effectively an undifferentiated continuous mass. Therefore, material 
atoms both induce the problems of the composition of the continuum noted above and 
(considered as an object of a divine decree) block their own realization for reasons 
connected to the PSR. 
 One loose end along these lines is that more recent types of monism, such as the 
version developed by Horgan & Potrč (2008), assert that although the entire physical world 
is prior to its regions, these regions display “local variation”, which is to say that regions of 
the physical world are qualitatively heterogeneous even though this heterogeneity is not a 
result of some underlying mereological structure. On this view, then, regions are not parts 
(and do not have parts) but they are not undifferentiated mass either.40 Does Leibniz’s view 
have anything to say about this?  
Of course, Leibniz is not engaged with a view exactly like Horgan & Potrč’s. 
However, the version of Material Monism suggested by De Volder (and outlined above) is 
sufficiently similar that some remarks are in order. Recall that according to De Volder, the 
entire physical world is a single substance with modally distinct regions, i.e. regions that 
vary in, and are thus demarcated by, only qualitative features. Though I cannot engage this 
question comprehensively here, one way Leibniz could respond to such a view would be to 
argue that qualitative variation belies internal mereological structure because the 
observable qualities of bodies always result from configurations of something more 
fundamental, e.g. motions of the parts. This is a basic tenet of the so-called “mechanical 
philosophy”, and one which Leibniz also adopts. In the Specimen of Dynamics, Leibniz 
makes this point in terms of his notion of “derivative force”: 
 
…by derivative force, namely, that by which bodies actually act on one another or 
are acted upon by one another, I understand, in this context, only that which is 
connected to motion (local motion, of course), and which, in turn tends further to 
produce local motion. For we acknowledge that all other material phenomena can 
be explained by local motion. (GM 6, 237 = AG 120) 
 
Leibniz can, therefore, respond to views like Horgan & Potrč’s by giving just such a 
mechanical analysis of observable qualities. 
However, there is one complication to consider. Even De Volder acknowledges that 
material parts have differential motions and that it is these motions that explain the 
observable qualities of matter. Still, De Volder denies that the material world has parts, 
strictly speaking: matter may have modally distinct regions with differential motions, but 
these are not independent parts. To address this point, Leibniz needs to leave the 
mechanical philosophy behind, or, at least, he needs to be clear about its limitations. For 
 
40 For other views that assert the possibility of qualitative heterogeneity without mereological structure, see 
McDaniel (2009) and Cornell (2016). Thanks to an anonymous referee from this journal for encouraging me 
to consider questions along these lines. 
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Leibniz, the motion of material parts requires the existence of active substances underlying 
matter. Matter alone is not sufficient to explain of force (e.g. motion, but also resistance to 
motion) in bodies. Writing to Johann Bernoulli in 1698, Leibniz makes this point clearly: 
 
…I have often said…that all phenomena in bodies, even the force of elasticity, can be 
explained mechanically. But the principles of mechanism or of the laws of motion 
cannot be derived from the consideration of extension and impenetrability alone; 
and so there must be something else in bodies from whose modification conatus and 
impetus arise, as shapes arise from the modification of extension. (Lo 9 = AG 167) 
 
Thus, motion requires something more fundamental “in” bodies that gives rise to it.41 This 
edges up against another major line of argument that Leibniz develops against merely 
material substance, namely what might be called the Argument from Force. It makes sense, 
I think, that to combat a picture of the material world so at odds with his own, Leibniz 
would need to bring a variety of resources to bear, resources at the center of his 
philosophical system. The interplay between Leibniz’s Argument from Unity, which has 
been the focus of my discussion above, and his Argument from Force certainly warrants 
further explanation, but I will leave further discussion of this interplay aside for now. 
 It remains to consider whether the Determinateness Thesis stands in tension with 
any of Leibniz’s other metaphysical commitments. Though the centrality of the 
Determinateness Thesis to Leibniz’s metaphysics makes this unlikely, there is at least one 
case that warrants attention, since it concerns certain features of the material world. 
Leibniz clearly asserts that bodies do not have precise shapes. Sometimes the way Leibniz 
expresses this view makes it seem as though the shapes of bodies are somehow 
indeterminate, or as Leibniz says “imaginary”. Take, for example, the following passage 
from Discourse on Metaphysics §12: 
 
It is even possible to demonstrate that the notions of size, shape, and motion are not 
as distinct as is imagined and that they contain something imaginary and relative to 
our perception, as do (though to a greater extent) color, heat, and other similar 
qualities, qualities about which one can doubt whether they are truly found in the 
nature of things outside ourselves. (A 6.4, 1545 = AG 44) 
 
Passages like this one make it sound as though Leibniz thinks that bodies ultimately lack 
features such as size, shape, and motion. If this is the case, doesn’t Leibniz’s rejection of 
precise shapes in bodies entail that there is some indeterminacy in the material world?  
On my view, the absence of precise shapes in bodies is ultimately consistent with 
the Determinateness Thesis. Leibniz’s rejection of precise shapes in bodies is best 
understood not as the claim that bodies have indeterminate shapes, but instead as the claim 
that bodies have no shapes whatsoever. To see this, some subtlety is required concerning 
the explication of Leibniz’s claim that bodies lack precise shapes. 
 
41 It is important to note that the relation between monads and bodies is not a mereological one, since 
monads or “substantial unities are not parts, but the foundations of phenomena” (Lo 303). Still, the notion of 
“foundation” employed by Leibniz here suggests a picture in opposition to the type of monism I am 
considering. 
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First, the fact that bodies lack precise shapes is, according to Leibniz, a consequence 
of the actually infinite division of matter. Consider the following passage from A Specimen 
of Discoveries of the Admirable Secrets of Nature in General from around 1688: 
 
Indeed, even though this may seem paradoxical, it must be realized that the notion 
of extension is not as transparent as is commonly believed. For from the fact that no 
body is so very small that it is not actually divided into parts excited by different 
motions, it follows that no determinate shape can be assigned to any body, nor is a 
precisely straight line, or circle, or any other assignable shape of any body, found in 
the nature of things, although certain rules are observed by nature even in its 
deviation from an infinite series. Thus shape involves something imaginary, and no 
other sword can sever the knots that we tie for ourselves by misunderstanding of 
the composition of the continuum. (A 6.4, 1622 = Ar 315) 
 
In this passage, Leibniz explicitly concludes that bodies lack precise shapes because of the 
actually infinite division of matter. Thus, the lack of shapes in bodies is a consequence of 
the fact that bodies are divided to infinity. 
 Second, on Leibniz’s account, we attribute precise shapes to bodies in virtue of our 
less-than-perfect senses in concert with our imagination. Importantly, Leibniz is explicit 
that, in fact, indeterminacy would arise if bodies were conceived as having precise, i.e. 
geometrical, shapes. The failure of bodies to have such shapes is, by contrast, clearly 
connected to the fact that bodies are divided to infinity: 
 
It is the imperfection and fault of our senses that makes us conceive of physical things 
as Mathematical Beings, in which there is indeterminacy. It can be demonstrated that 
there is no line or shape in nature that gives exactly and keeps uniformly for the least 
space and time the properties of a straight or circular line, or of any other line whose 
definition a finite mind can comprehend. (GP 7, 563; trans. Levey 2005, 16) 
 
Far from being a basis for attributing indeterminacy to bodies, then, the lack of precise 
shapes is both consistent with, and ultimately follows from the fact that bodies are actually 
infinitely divided.42 
 Finally, in Leibniz’s considered analysis, the difference between precise, geometrical 
shapes and the infinitely divided and determinate structure of actually existing bodies is, as 
he puts it, “less than any given amount that can be specified”, i.e. it is an unassignable 
difference. As Leibniz writes to De Volder,  
 
42 For a detailed development of this orientation towards Leibniz’s rejection of precise shapes in the physical 
world, see Levey (2005). As Levey concludes, “[i]n the manifest image of nature, bodies appear to us to be 
moving absolutely and to be finitely complex geometrical objects; neither of those appearances can be 
absolutely true of the world outside us, as can be demonstrated by an analysis of the paradoxes of the 
composition of the continuum and by the argument from the equivalence of hypotheses. Yet behind the 
manifest image is a corporeal world constituted by forces that yield infinitely complex fractal bodies and 
determine those bodies to be in absolute states of rest and motion. This world is too finely grained and too 
rapidly changing for a finite mind's perception of it be sustained in consciousness, and so the imagination 
rounds out a partial representation of the world and thereby furnishes us with a sensory experience that 
leaves most of the details of corporeal reality obscure” (26-27). 
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However, the science of continua, that is, the science of possible things, contains eternal 
truths, truths which are never violated by actual phenomena, since the difference is 
always less than any given amount that can be specified. (Lo 333 = AG 186) 
 
Here again, the fact that the difference between the “actual phenomena”, i.e.  bodies, and 
true continua, i.e. geometrical shapes, is less than any assignable quantity is based on the 
fact that the division of bodies is actually infinite. 
 Putting all of this together, the best way to understand Leibniz’s rejection of precise 
shapes in bodies is to say that, strictly speaking, bodies have no shape whatsoever. The 
attribution of any candidate shape to a particular body is precluded by the fact that the 
body is actually infinitely divided and, therefore, its boundary is not uniform across any 
extent. This understanding of Leibniz’s rejection of precise shapes aligns with the 
discreteness of matter because discreteness goes all the way down, so to speak. The fact 
that each part of matter is divided to infinity means that any putative boundary of a body is 
not a smooth boundary, but is broken down into smaller and smaller boundaries of smaller 
and smaller bodies. This is what prompts Levey (2005) to claim that “…behind the manifest 
image is a corporeal world constituted by forces that yield infinitely complex fractal 
bodies” (26). I am sympathetic with Levey’s view that bodies have infinitely complex 
shapes, so long as this is understood to mean, given Leibniz’s views about the infinite, that 
they have no shape whatever, strictly speaking.43  
 To sum up, then, I believe that even if Leibniz’s commitment to the Determinateness 
Thesis has not been fully vindicated, I have adequately articulated its character and 
motivation within Leibniz’s metaphysics, both as it relates to his analysis of materiality and 
more broadly. I have also ruled out potential concerns about its alignment with certain 
features of Leibniz’s considered analysis of bodies, in particular his claim that bodies do not 
have precise shapes. In the end, the Determinateness Thesis is a central commitment of 
Leibniz’s metaphysical project. Thus, it is not altogether surprising to find it playing an 
important role in the background of Leibniz’s Argument from Unity, which is one of 




 Leibniz’s view that matter is discrete is a view about the character of material things 
and their parts. According to the characterization given, material things are, strictly 
speaking, pluralities, i.e. collections of pre-existing parts. Without this characterization, 
Leibniz’s commitment to the Plurality Thesis would be a weak point in his familiar 
Argument from Unity against material substances.  
As I noted above, it was fairly common in the 17th & 18th century to claim that 
material things have actual parts.44 Leibniz shares this commitment. In Leibniz’s hands, this 
commitment amounts to the claim that material parts are independent with respect to 
 
43 See also footnote 18 above. 
44 For a detailed discussion of the so-called “actual parts doctrine” among the early moderns, see Holden 
(2004), Ch. 2. For discussion of the way Leibniz’s views about material parts relate to the actual parts 
doctrine, see Harmer (2019). 
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motion, and that they enjoy a relative priority to wholes they compose. However, what 
material things ultimately depend on, for Leibniz—what is absolutely fundamental—are 
not material parts at all, but non-material substances. These substances provide the 
ultimate foundation for the existence of the material world. 
These commitments are connected: the discreteness of matter supports a key 
premise—the Plurality Thesis—in Leibniz’s Argument from Unity, which is a central 
argument in the development of Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics. But there is a deep 
tension in the picture of the material world outlined above. The parts of matter, although 
actual, are also vanishing; the very boundaries that serve to distinguish material parts are 
themselves vanishing. Thus, discrete matter itself calls out for a foundation in non-material 
substances. This tension is at the center of Leibniz’s rejection of the substantiality of 
material objects. But it only comes to the fore through an examination of Leibniz’s 
commitment to the discreteness of matter. Since material objects are discrete all the way 
down, they are inherently pluralities, and therefore, they cannot be ontologically 
fundamental. The infinitely descending structure of matter points towards the further 
conclusion that Leibniz wants to draw from the line of thought detailed above: if matter is 
to exist at all, discrete matter in particular, it requires a foundation in something non-
material. Therefore, Leibniz’s commitment to discreteness drives his argument (or, at least, 
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